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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OE' UTAH 
KEN HOLM and GLEN STEED 
d/b/a H & S ENTERPRISES, 
a partnership, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
B & M SERVICE, INC. , 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 18067 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant to 
recover damages for the negligent destruction to plaintiffs' 
personal property. (R.2,3) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was granted on the 
ground that the Statute of Limitations had run on plaintiffs' 
claim. (R.6,9) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the order dismissing 
plaintiffs' complaint and that the matter be remanded to Third 
District Court for further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 30, 1978 plaintiffs were moving $40,000 worth 
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of steel pipe with their tractor and trailer 18 miles east of 
Rangeley, Colorado. Plaintiffs' tractor and trailer overturned 
causing minor damage to the pipe. (R.2,3) 
The Colorado Highway Patrol investigated the accident 
and at its request, defendant's tractor attempted to tow plain-
tiffs' trailer carrying the steel pipe to the nearest town. (R.2,3) 
Due to the recklessness and negligence of defendant's 
agents in securing the pipe to the trailer, coupling its tractor 
to the trailer and other particulars of negligence, the tractor 
of defendant and the trailer of plaintiffs overturned a second 
time causing extensive damage and destruction to plaintiffs' 
steel pipe. (R.2,3) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL NEGLIGENT TORTS, INCLUDING PROPERTY DAMAGE, SHOULD 
BE GOVERNED BY THE PROVISION OF THE FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS, 78-12-25(2), UCA (1953). 
The sole issue involved in this appeal is whether 
negligently caused property damage should be governed by the three 
year statute of limitations, 78-12-26(2), UCA (1953) or the four 
year statute of limitations, supra. 
The four year statute of limitations, 78-12-25(2), UCA 
(1953) provides as follows: 
Within four years: 
( 1) 
( 2) An action for relief not otherwise provided 
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for by law. 
The three year statute of limitations, 78-12-26(2), UCA 
(1953) provides as follows: 
Within three years -
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury 
to real property; provided, that when waste or trespass 
is committed by means of underground works upon any 
mining claim, the cause of action shall not be deemed 
to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting such waste or trespass. 
(2) An action for taking, detaining or injuring 
personal property, including actions for specific 
recovery thereof; provided, that in all cases where 
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually 
included in the term "livestock", if such animal had 
strayed or was stolen from the true owner without his 
fault, the cause shall not be deemed to have accrued 
until the owner has actual knowledge of such facts as 
would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the 
possession thereof by the defendant. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud 
or mistake; but the cause of action in such case shall 
not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by 
the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud 
or mistake. 
(4) An action for a liability created by the 
statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or 
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except where 
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed 
by the statutes of this state. 
In construing 78-12-26(2), supra, the 10th Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Utah Poultry and Farmers Cooperative v. Utah 
Ice and Storage Company, 187 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1951), had the 
following to say: 
No decision has been cited, and we have found none, 
wherein the courts of Utah or California have specifically 
held the three year statute "all inclusive", of actions 
for injuries to personal property. We think, however, 
that the language of the adjudicated cases indicates a 
disposition to apply the statute to all actions for 
"taking, detaining or injuring personal property"." 
(emphasis added) . 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There are still no Utah cases holding the three year 
statute to be all inclusive for injuries to personal property. 
In the case of Reese v. Qualtrough, 48 Utah 23, 156 P. 
955 (1916) defendants ''had willfully and intentionally flowed 
large quantities of waste water through certain ditches ... and 
had willfully and intentionally changed the course of said ditches 
. willfully and intentionally diverted the waters from the 
stream ... killing plaintiff's fish living therein ... will-
fully and intentionally place certain boards into the bed of the 
stream . . . whereby large numbers of said fish were killed and 
destroyed II . . . . 
This was clearly and unequivocally an intentional tort 
and the court correctly decided that the three year statute was 
applicable. 
The language in Reese v. Qualtrough, supra, that, "It 
is the wrongful acts which result in injury and damage which give 
the right of action, and, if the injuries are to personal property, 
the statute fixes the time within which such an action must be 
brought, and the name of the action can have no effect upon the 
question of what statute controls.", should be construed as being 
limited to intentional injuries. 
Subdivisions (1), (2) and (3) of 78-12-26, UCA (1953) 
describe intentional torts, acts or misconduct. The application 
of the four year statute rather than subdivision (1) of the three 
year statute was ruled upon in the case of O'Neill v. San Pedro, 
L.A. & S.L. R. Co., 38 Utah 475, 114 P.127 (1911). Plaintiff's 
house was located near defendant's railroad tracks and was damaged 
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by the jar of the trains and the emission of smoke and cinders. 
The court held that subdivision (1) of the three year statute, 
trespass to lands, was not applicable because there was no common 
law trespass which required direct entry on lands. Instead, the 
court held that the acts of defendant railroad were action on the 
case and the four year statute was applicable. 
The following language was cited approvingly by the 
Supreme Court of Washington in Welch v. Seattle & M.R. Co, 56 
Wash. 97, 105 P.166 (1909), the case having been cited in Reese 
v. Qualtrough, supra: 
Mr. Blackstone, on star page 123 of Book 3 (Lewis' 
Ed.), makes a distinction as follows: "And it is a 
settled distinction that, where an act is done which 
is in itself an immediate injury to another's person 
or property, there the remedy is usually by an action 
of trespass vi et armis; but where there is no act done, 
but only a culpable omission, or where the act is not 
immediately injurious, but only by consequence and 
collaterally, there no action of trespass vi et armis 
will lie, but an action on the special case, as the 
damages consequent on such omission or act." 
Thus, analysis of the factual situation in terms of 
whether it sounds in trespass or in action on the case has been 
the subject of judicial inquiry for hundreds of years and has 
been exercised by the Utah Supreme Court in the O'Neill case, supra. 
Analysis and application to the instant case demonstrates 
the damage in plaintiff's personal property was unintentional 
and therefore, action on the case, and plaintiff's claim should 
have been held to be subject to the four year statute of limitations. 
Personal injuries resulting from negligent misconduct 
are governed by the four year statute of limitations. See Thomas 
v. Union Pacific R. Co., 1 Utah 235 ( ) . One of the most 
-5-
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frequently asserted causes of action excluding divorce and debt 
suits is for personal injury arising out of an automobile accident. 
In a great many of these cases a claim for automobile damage arise 
out of the accident. 
This court has held that splitting causes of action is 
improper and a plaintiff's claims for personal injury and property 
damage must be asserted in one action. Raymer v. Hi-Line Transport, 
Inc., 15 Utah 2d 427, 394 P.2d 333 (1964). If the three year 
statute is applicable to negligently caused property damage as 
contended by respondent then the plaintiff who waits for three 
and one-half years for his severe and perhaps permanent injury to 
stabilize before filing suit has lost his claim for his property 
damage. See Dearden v. Hey, Mass. , 24 NE.2d 644 (1939). 
Respondent further claims that there would be two 
different limitation periods for damage to personal property and 
this would subvert the purpose of the three statute "because it 
is nearly always possible to allege an intentional tort in terms 
of negligence." Alleging a negligent tort rather than an 
intentional tort still leaves plaintiff with the burden of proving 
negligence in order to justify the longer period of limitation. 
In the recent case of Matheson v. Pearson, Utah, 619 
P.2d 321 (1980) this court found two different periods of limita-
tion were applicable to an injury situation requiring a factual 
determination as to whether a tort was intentional or negligent 
and whether the one year statute of limitations or the four year 
statute of limitations was applicable. 
It is submitted, contrary to respondent's contentions, 
that 78-12-26(2) UCA (1953) is not clear and unambiguous. "Taking" 
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and "detaining" "personal property" means forceful and intentional 
if any language ever could. Also it is submitted that the "or" 
linking "taking, detaining" "with injuring personal property" is 
conjunctive so that the "injuring" must be part of the "taking" 
and "detaining". 
This interpretation is reinforced by including the action 
for specific recovery of personal property in the statute itself. 
The very presence of this remedy suggests intentional wrong doing. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that this court should rule that negli-
gently caused injuries to personal property are governed by the 
provisions of 78-12-25(2) rather than 78-12-26(2). The three year 
statute can and should be interpreted that way. Bench and bar 
alike will be able to detect an intentional tort under 78-12-26(2) 
and a negligent tort under 78-12-25(2). 
Dated this day of March, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Wendell P. Ables 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
Suite 14, Intrade Building 
1399 South Seventh East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of March, 1982 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief, to Dale 
J. Lambert of Christensen, Jensen and Powell, Attorneys for 
Defendant, 900 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
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